

SECTION A: SOURCE-BASED QUESTIONS

QUESTION 2: WHAT IMPACT DID THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALÉ HAVE ON SOUTH AFRICA AND CUBA?

SOURCE 2A

The source below discusses the defeat of the South African Defence Force (SADF) by the Cuban military forces at the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

In 1987 to 1988, the myth (fiction) of the invincibility (cannot be defeated) of the South African military machine was laid to rest, with important consequences for social change. In July 1987, the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched a major attack into south-eastern Angola. This was an attempt to prevent the Angolan government forces from capturing the town of Mavinga from UNITA and to extend the area under UNITA control. The South African and UNITA forces met unexpectedly strong resistance from Angolan (MPLA) and Cuban forces around the town of Cuito Cuanavale.

Despite the arrival of fresh SADF reinforcements in December 1987 and the use of their most destructive and sophisticated weapons, such as aircraft, artillery, tanks and armoured cars, they still suffered heavy casualties and failed to capture Cuito Cuanavale. Meanwhile other Angolan (MPLA) and Cuban military forces moved towards the Namibian border and cut off South Africa's line of retreat (withdrawal).

Decisive in the SADF's defeat was the loss of air superiority. The South African Air Force found itself unable to match the modern Soviet equipment brought into battle by the defenders. South African aircraft were unable to penetrate the radar/missile defences at Cuito Cuanavale and when the Cuban forces launched an air strike on the Calueque Dam in June 1988, the SADF air defence proved inadequate.

[From *Foundations of the New South Africa* by J Pampallis]

2.1 Read Source 2A.

2.1.1 Why did the SADF launch a major attack in south-eastern Angola in 1987, according to the source? (2 x 1) (2)

- 2.1.2 Identify TWO military forces in the source that 'moved towards the Namibian border and cut off South Africa's line of retreat'. (2 x 1) (2)
- 2.1.3 Using the information in the source and your own knowledge, comment on why the SADF's air wing failed to defeat the Cuban air force. (2 x 2) (4)

SOURCE 2B

The source below explains the consequences of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

Nonetheless, the commitment of Cuban troops had radically altered (changed) the balance of power in southern Africa. The prospect of more white conscripts being killed by a well-armed Cuban adversary (enemy), the cost of the war and the impact it had on South Africa's economy prompted (pressured) South Africa to leave Cuito Cuanavale.

In April 1988, PW Botha's cabinet agreed to begin direct negotiations with Angola and Cuba under Chester Crocker's (US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) mediation. As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded, 'military considerations weighed most heavily in Pretoria's decision to negotiate', elaborating that 'for the first time in modern history, its leadership was unnerved (frightened) by the prospect of a well-armed adversary (enemy) able to inflict (cause) serious casualties on South African forces in conventional warfare ... causing President PW Botha and his senior advisers to accept reluctantly a truce (peace) and the idea of negotiating Namibian independence in exchange for Cuban troop withdrawal'.

A flurry (series) of negotiations now gradually brought Crocker's linkage plan closer to reality. Although it would take twelve rounds of talks, on 22 December 1988 two treaties were signed at the United Nations Organisation, one between Angola and Cuba arranging the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the other among Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreeing to Namibian independence. Crocker's long fight was over, his goal of brokering (negotiating) a regional peace deal was realised at last.

[From *Journal of Southern African Studies*, volume 35, number 1: Chester Crocker and the South African Border War, 1981–1989. A Reappraisal of Linkage by Z Kagan-Guthrie]

2.2 Study Source 2B.

2.2.1 List THREE reasons in the source that prompted South Africa to leave Cuito Cuanavale. (3 x 1) (3)

2.2.2 According to the source, who was the leader of South Africa during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale? (1 x 1) (1)

2.2.3 Quote evidence from the source that suggests that the President of South Africa and his advisors accepted a truce. (2 x 1) (2)

2.2.4 Explain what you think is implied by the statement, 'Crocker's long fight was over, his goal of brokering (negotiating) a regional peace deal was realised at last' in the context of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. (2 x 2) (4)

SOURCE 2C

The source below is an extract from a letter written by Oscar Oramas Oliva (Cuban representative at the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation) to the President of the Security Council on 22 December 1988. It includes the terms of the tripartite peace agreement that Cuba, South Africa and Angola signed.

Cuba and Angola agree that the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Angola are closely linked to peace and security in the south-western region of Africa; that a tripartite agreement between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the south-western region of Africa, is to be signed.

We now therefore hold it to be established that the conditions have been created which permit the commencement of the return to its homeland of the Cuban military contingent (delegation) now present in Angolan territory, which has successfully fulfilled its internationalist mission. We accordingly agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The ... phased and total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50 000 man contingent of Cuban troops.

ARTICLE 3

Both parties request the Security Council to carry out verification (confirmation) of the redeployment and the phased and total withdrawal of the Cuban troops from the territory of Angola ...

ARTICLE 4

This Agreement shall come into force upon the signature of the tripartite agreement between Cuba, Angola and South Africa.

The withdrawal of the Cuban forces should be according to the following timeframes: By 1 November 1989: 25 000; by 1 April 1990: 33 000; by 1 October 1990: 38 000 and by 1 July 1991: 50 000.

[From <https://peacemaker.un.org/angola-protocol-brazzaville88>. Accessed on 11 September 2019.]

2.3 Consult Source 2C.

2.3.1 Which TWO issues, according to the source, were closely linked to the peace and security of the south-western region of Africa? (2 x 1) (2)

2.3.2 Define the concept *independence* in the context of Angola. (1 x 2) (2)

2.3.3 Explain what Oliva implied by the statement, 'the Cuban military contingent (delegation) has successfully fulfilled its internationalist mission'. (2 x 2) (4)

2.3.4 Comment on the role that the United Nations Organisation played during the peace negotiations in Angola. (2 x 2) (4)

SOURCE 2D

The photograph below shows Cuban soldiers leaving Angola after the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The photograph was taken on 10 January 1989. The photographer is unknown.



[From <https://images.app.goo.gl/eV3xyTXEZEqr79W96>. Accessed on 16 April 2019.]

2.4 Use Source 2D.

2.4.1 Explain the messages that are conveyed in the photograph. (2 x 2) (4)

- 2.4.2 Comment on the usefulness of this source to a historian researching the outcome of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. (2 x 2) (4)
- 2.5 Refer to Sources 2C and 2D. Explain how the information in Source 2C supports the evidence in Source 2D regarding Cuba's role in the Angolan Civil War. (2 x 2) (4)
- 2.6 Using the information in the relevant sources and your own knowledge, write a paragraph of about EIGHT lines (about 80 words) explaining the impact that the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale had on South Africa and Cuba. (8) [50]